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Australian Approaches to International
Environmental Law during the Howard Years
Gregory Rose∗
I. Introduction
This paper provides an overview of major Australian developments in international
environmental law during the term of the Howard government. It argues that
Australian approaches to the field of international environmental law under the
Howard government were primarily characterised by emphasis on sovereign rights,
shared global responsibility, market forces and compliance. The emphasis on
sovereign rights refers to the Howard government’s robust assertion of Australian
autonomous and effective sovereign control over the use of its claimed natural
resources. International law establishes and recognises sovereign states’ rights to
develop and to manage the natural resources within their respective jurisdictions.1
The emphasis on shared global responsibility refers to the government’s approach
to participation with other states in the development of international and regional
regimes for management of the shared environment or coordination with other
countries to combat common environmental problems. The government’s approach
posed a major challenge to some understandings of the international environmental
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, which distinguishes
between the obligations of developed and developing countries in combating
common global environmental problems by imposing heavier responsibilities upon
developed countries.2 The emphasis on market forces meant that the government
resisted the development of environmental regimes that would utilise traderestrictive mechanisms that interfere with the free play of the marketplace, although
∗
1

2

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. The author is grateful
for helpful comments provided by Dr Warwick Gullett.
United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration),
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I,
3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I), Principle 2: ‘States have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’
Ibid Principle 7: ‘States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility
that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and
financial resources they command.’
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it supported the design of environmental regimes that would harness market
forces. 3 Finally, in relation to the emphasis on compliance, the Howard
government’s approach demonstrated a commitment to the implementation and
domestic enforcement of Australia’s international legal obligations. This is
consistent with a contemporary global emphasis in international environmental law
that urges stronger domestic implementation, recognising that, although there is a
plethora of new international environmental treaties, they typically suffer from
poor compliance.4
Each of the approaches argued as characterising the Howard government can be
contraindicated in some instances. For example, despite the trend toward stronger
compliance systems, there are weaknesses in several compliance review processes.
Such qualifications do not negate the arguments made here. The emphasis on
sovereign rights, shared responsibility, market forces and compliance were
dominant, not exclusive or absolute, tendencies in the Howard government’s
approaches to international law in the field of environment and natural resources.
As a further qualifier, it would be misleading to refer to the ‘Howard
government approach’ as distinct or unique. There is a great deal of continuity
between governments and the Howard government’s policies continued many of
those of the previous Keating government. For example, the Howard government
continued the Keating government’s approach to climate change negotiations.
Thus, the differences are typically of degree and therefore the Howard
government’s policies are characterised in terms of changes in emphasis, rather
than direction.
The Howard government placed more weight on domestic economic and
electoral concerns than on perceptions of international environmental citizenship
when it assessed Australia’s interests in the international politics of the
environment. Each treaty action undertaken by the government, that is, the
ratification of or accession to a treaty or an amendment, was subject to a newly
introduced national impact analysis (NIA) prepared by the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade and considered in Parliament by the Joint Standing Committee
on Treaties (JSCOT), which made recommendations on each proposed action to the
executive government to consider. 5 In the author’s opinion, the government’s
3

4

5

Ibid Principle 12: ‘States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable
development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental
degradation.’
See eg, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Annex, 4 September 2002,
UN Doc A/CONF.199/20; D Zaelke, D Kaniaru, and E Kruzikova (eds), Making Law
Work: Environmental Compliance & Sustainable Development (vol 1, 2005).
The NIA and JSCOT processes were introduced by the Howard government early in
its incumbency, fulfilling an electoral promise. See: D Williams, ‘Australia’s Treaty
Making Processes: The Coalitions Reform Proposals’ in P Alston and M Chiam (eds),
Treaty-making and Australia: globalization versus sovereignty? (1995) 185-95; and
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/
index.htm>.
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approaches to international environmental law issues served Australia’s national
interests well, for the most part, especially in relation to sustainable management of
the marine environment and the natural resources in the Western Pacific region.
However, it failed to properly appreciate the high national cost of its rejection of
the international consensus on climate change.
How well the government served as a global environmental citizen is a more
ambiguous assessment and is not attempted here. The notion of the ‘objectives of
the international community’ implies the identification of international actors or
agents in terms that set out a consolidated and defined position on a particular
political issue that can then be compared with the Australian government’s position
on that issue. Yet the international community is difficult to identify and legitimate
in representative terms (ie who is an authoritative representative of the collective?)
and its objectives or interests are usually difficult to define and to legitimate in
environmental terms (ie what is the best scientific and socio-economic policy?). In
the two instances of treaties that the Howard government negotiated but, in contrast
to most states, did not ratify (concerning greenhouse gas emissions reductions and
biosafety in the trade in genetically modified organisms), it can be asserted that the
government did not meet the consensus standards set for global environmental
citizenship. Ultimately, however, the Howard government’s impact on the
development of international law to protect the environment cannot be
simplistically assessed as good or bad overall. It needs finer focus in respect of the
various outcomes in each sector of international environmental law.

II. Method
International law in the field of environment and natural resources is comprised
principally of rights and obligations established by treaties. Thus, this paper
focuses on approaches to Australian environmental treaties in both the treaties
negotiation and implementation phases. Treaty rights and obligations are
supplemented by the environmental principles established or emerging under
customary international law. Those principles guide negotiations for cooperative
arrangements, although their precise content and legal status are often not well
crystallised. Towards the end of this paper the congruence or divergence of the
government’s approaches with these international environmental principles is
briefly addressed.
Australia is party to 241 treaties classified as directly related to environment
and natural resources management.6 Obviously, the enquiry conducted here cannot
be comprehensive. It focuses on only a few major treaties. It is organised by
distinguishing treaties according to environmental sectors. Examination of each
sector prevents the use of ‘cherry-picked’ or biased examples to demonstrate an
asserted ‘Howard government approach’. This provides a more robust analytical
method than selective examples and also facilitates coherent description of
innovative policies adopted in each area, while allowing cross-sectoral analysis to
draw out the common themes in each of the government’s approaches. However,
6

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/index.html>.

Australian

Treaties
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the division of environmental treaties into sectoral groups is an approximate
exercise. Most treaties embrace some matters across sectors or are by nature
cross-sectoral.
The author is indebted for information presented here to the annual reports on
Australia published in the Yearbook of International Environmental Law.7 Other
sources include journal publications and the federal government department
websites.

III. Review and Analysis
The treaty groupings identified for the purposes of this study are: biodiversity
conservation, marine environment protection, marine living resources management,
atmosphere protection, hazardous materials management, and the general
framework of principles for sustainable development.
(a) Biodiversity conservation
In relation to biodiversity conservation, the following section examines the Howard
government’s approaches to implementation of the Convention on Biological
Diversity8 (CBD) and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol),9
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna 10 (CITES), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 11 (Ramsar Convention) and the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage12 (World
Heritage Convention).
(i) Biological diversity
The idea for a major reform of Commonwealth environmental legislation
germinated in the latter days of the Keating government. However, the
conceptualisation and development of new legislation was the work of Robert Hill,
environment minister under the Howard government. The Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) Chapter 5 sets out obligations
for the conservation of biodiversity. It came into force in 2000, signifying a major
evolutionary step in Commonwealth implementation of the CBD.
The EPBC Act takes a comprehensive and programmatic approach to
biodiversity conservation. It requires the identification, listing and monitoring of
Australian biological diversity. Identified threatened species and ecological
communities are to be protected, including through the use of recovery plans. Alien
species that may threaten Australian biodiversity are to be controlled and
7

8
9
10
11
12

Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1996-2006). Australian reports therein
have been variously contributed by Donald R Rothwell, Stephen Bowhuis, Maureen
Grant-Thomson, Mark Driver, and officers of the Australian Office of International
Law at the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.
(5 June 1992), 170 UNTS 143.
(29 January 2000), 39 ILM 1027.
(3 March 1973), 993 UNTS 243.
(2 February 1971), 996 UNTS 245.
[1975] ATS 47.
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addressed, including through threat abatement plans. A range of types of protected
areas can be declared and, in a novel step, systems for their regulation are
specified, especially management plans. In another innovative measure, Part 14 of
the Act provides for the adoption of agreements between the government and other
persons for the conservation of biodiversity on private or public land or in marine
areas. In conformity with the CBD, the Act also provides for the making of
regulations to control access to biological resources as forms of material and
intellectual property. 13 These legal reforms were underpinned by major new
funding: approximately $A2.5 billion was made available under the Natural
Heritage Trust established by the government.14
The EPBC Act delivered relatively rigorous management mechanisms to
implement the CBD. The Act requires the use of a variety of specifically adapted
management plans and gives them a coherent legal basis, moving beyond the
previous policy-based strategy. 15 It also reflected the Howard government’s
conviction that market forces should be harnessed in the sphere of environmental
management, as evident in the use of conservation agreements with private
landholders. Initial conservationist criticisms of it have generally moderated
towards more positively nuanced perspectives.16

13

14

15
16

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 301.
Commonwealth regulations were adopted in 2000 that require that, in order to obtain
access, a researcher must come to an agreement with the access provider to share the
benefits of the commercial research: Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Regulations 2000 (Cth) pt 8A. See C Lawson, ‘Implementing an
objective of the Convention on Biological Diversity – Intellectual Property, access to
genetic resources and benefit sharing in Australia’ (2005) 22 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 130.
National Heritage Trust <http://www.nht.gov.au/index.html>. The Natural Heritage
Trust was created using revenue coming from the partial privatisation of the national
telecommunications carrier, Telstra, in an arrangement negotiated with a minority
party, the Democrats, to secure the Democrats vote for the privatisation.
Commonwealth of Australia, National Strategy for the Conservation of Australia’s
Biological Diversity (1996).
S Chappell, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(Cth): One Year Later’ (2001) 18 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 523;
A Nugent, ‘A Revolutionary Three Years in Environmental Management? The
Implementation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act ‘
(2003) No 3 National Environmental Law Review 30; A McIntosh, ‘Why the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act’s Referral, Assessment
and Approval Process is Failing to Meet its Environmental Objectives’ (2004) 21
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 268; C McGrath, ‘Swells in the Stream of
Australian Environmental Law: Debate on the EPBC Act’ (2006) 23 Environmental
and Planning Law Journal 165; L Thomas and T Stephens, ‘Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act: New Prospects for Effective Implementation?’
(2007) 18 Public Law Review 84; J Peel and L Godden, ‘The Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act: Dark Sides of Virtue’ (2007) 31 Melbourne
University Law Review 106.
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(ii) Biosafety
Throughout the conduct of negotiations for the Biosafety Protocol, the Howard
government sought to protect trade opportunities for Australian agricultural
holdings that wished to use living genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
particularly for crop plantings.17 The government therefore formed a negotiating
bloc with like-minded agricultural produce exporting countries, called the Miami
Group, which sought to avoid the imposition of trade barriers against the
importation of GMO-derived agricultural produce by other countries.18 Ultimately,
the Biosafety Protocol, as adopted in 2000, does not apply to produce processed
from GMO materials (such as canola oil processed from rape seed), thereby
enabling trade in them. However, in relation to living GMOs (such as seeds), it
requires an exporting country to seek a permit from the importing country’s
authorities. It also requires the importing country to base its decision on a robust
scientific and economic assessment of the anticipated detrimental impact of the
GMOs. Therefore, trade in living GMOs is restricted, although by an agreed
procedure.
Ultimately, the government did not ratify the Biosafety Protocol,19 reflecting its
concerns to maintain open trade for Australian commodities exporters. It thereby
failed to undertake a share of responsibility to avoid harm to potential importing
countries. This could contribute to an erosion of perceptions of Australia’s bona
fides, particularly in light of domestic steps taken to ensure the safeguarding of the
Australian environment and people from biosafety risks.20
(iii) Wildlife trade
In 2002, a newly inserted Part 13A of the EPBC Act commenced operation,
replacing the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act of 1982
that regulated wildlife trade and implemented CITES. Part 13A streamlined permits
for commercial operators, enhanced transparency of decision-making and
strengthened enforcement powers. The three appendices of the previous Act, that
17

18

19
20

For the same policy reason, Australia joined as a third party in the complaints brought
by Argentina, Canada and the United States against a European Union moratorium on
imports of GMO agricultural and food products; see: EC - Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products WT/DS291 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_
e/ds291_e.htm>.
A substantial proportion of farmers represented in the latter countries did not wish to
allow importation of GMO crops and produce, because they either use organic farming
methods or could not compete with large-scale GMO plantings or cannot afford GMO
seeds, and they feared the possible contamination of their crops by GMO seeds in food
produce or other imports; see IISD Reporting Services, Earth Negotiations Bulletin –
EXCOP Biosafety Protocol (2000) <http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/excop/index.html>.
Nor has it been ratified as of the time of writing.
The government developed legislation, passed in 2000, to assess and manage the
domestic health and environment risks in Australia associated with GMOs: Gene
Technology Act 2000 (Cth). Management plans are to be developed and adopted with
the support of the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, an office created to
address the relevant environmental, public health and safety risks from GMOs: Office
of the Gene Technology Regulator <http://www.ogtr.gov.au>.
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corresponded to the three CITES appendices, were consolidated into one list for all
CITES species.21
In accordance with CITES (Art XIV), a party can apply stricter trade control
measures than in CITES itself and this is provided for in the EPBC Act.22 In fact,
the Commonwealth applies stricter measures to some exotic species, such as
African elephants, treating them as if listed on CITES Appendix I, which prohibits
commercial trade, although CITES resolutions have demoted certain African
populations to Appendix II to allow commercial trade.23 In addition, the EPBC Act
goes beyond the CITES obligations to address not only species listed in CITES, but
also all exports of Australian native wildlife and all imports of live exotic
species.24 In relation to exports of Australian wildlife, the government consistently
sought to delete from the Annex Australian native species that are listed in Annex
II of CITES but that are not the subject of international trade.
Part 13A reflects the Howard government’s emphasis on market efficiency by
simplifying Australian regulation of international trade in endangered species. It
also strengthens legal opportunities for domestic enforcement and was welcomed
by environmental groups in this regard.25 Yet, the government’s unwillingness to
countenance importation of some exotic species allowed under CITES reflected
non-acceptance of certain classifications mediated under CITES, even where such
classifications were introduced to support the conservation of a species, such as for
the sustainable use of elephants. This unilateralism might suggest the neglect of
shared responsibility for international trade under CITES in favour of domestic
electoral concerns.
(iv) Wetlands
Australia hosted the 6th Conference of Parties of the 1971 Ramsar Convention
in Brisbane in the second week of the Howard government’s incumbency, in
March 1996.The Australian initiatives taken in support of wetlands conservation at
that time were those of the Keating government. 26 However, the Howard
21

22
23
24

25

26

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 303CA. For
each species included in the list, there is to be a notation describing the specimens
belonging to that species that are included in a particular Appendix to CITES,
identifying the Appendix and identifying the date on which the provisions of CITES
first applied to the specimens: s 303CA(3).
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 303CB.
Consideration of proposals for the transfer of African elephant populations from
Appendix I to Appendix II, 9-20 June 1997, CITES Doc Conf. 10.9.
The export of native species and import of live specimens are addressed separately in
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 303DA303DJ and ss303EA-303EQ, respectively.
TRAFFIC Oceania, ‘New Federal Wildlife Bill Sets World’s Best Practice Standards’
(2001), in C Sharma, ‘Enforcement Mechanisms for Endangered Species Protection in
Hong Kong: A Legal Perspective’ (2003-2004) 5 Vermont Journal of Environmental
Law 1, 25.
The addition of seven Australian sites to the Ramsar list of Wetlands of International
Importance, a $A2 million contribution to the Ramsar Convention’s Strategic Plan,
resource support for the establishment of an international wetlands training program
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government subsequently acted consistently in continuing that support.27 In 2004,
the Minister for Environment brought the first civil enforcement action against an
Australian land-holder for destruction of listed wetlands. Civil penalties in the sum
of $A450,000 for damage to the Gwydir wetlands were ordered by the Federal
Court and upheld on appeal in 2005.28 The implementation actions and, especially,
the enforcement litigation, were indicative of the Howard government’s emphasis
on compliance with international commitments.
(v) World heritage
The Howard government successfully nominated new sites to be listed as
Australian world heritage areas under the 1972 United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Convention.
These included the first Australian cultural properties to be listed.29
The management of Australian sites so as to maintain the world heritage values
for which they were nominated was a more vexed issue. In 1996, in contrast to the
Keating government decision not to approve a proposal to build a resort within the
Wet Tropics of Queensland World Heritage Area, the Howard government
approved a proposal to construct a marina and to dredge an access channel at Port
Hinchinbrook, subject to strict conditions. A legal challenge to the approval failed
before the Federal Court30 and, on appeal, also before the Full Federal Court.31 A
comparable issue arose in connection with the world heritage area at Kakadu
National Park, where a proposal was approved for a new uranium mine sited on the
existing Jabiluka mineral lease, an enclave within the world heritage area. In that
case the dispute was internationalised by Australian nationals’ representations to
the World Heritage Bureau. In 1998, the Bureau sent a mission to Australia to

27

28

29

30

31

for Pacific Island countries and a cooperative project with Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea.
In 1999, for example, it nominated four Ramsar wetlands sites and committed $A0.8
million to a new National Wetlands Program and to an Asia-Pacific Wetlands
Managers Training Program. In 2000, an Asia-Pacific Migratory Bird Strategy 20012005, to be coordinated by Wetlands International, was also adopted. In 2001, four
new sites were nominated for the Ramsar list and six in 2002, and a further one the
next year. In compliance with the resolutions of Ramsar COP 7, an Australian national
action plan on wetlands communication, education and awareness was adopted in
2002.
Minister for Environment and Heritage v Greentree (2004) FCA 1317 and on appeal
(2005) FCAFC 128; M Baird, ‘The EPBC Act and Ramsar wetlands: an examination
of the Greentree decisions’ (2004) 3 National Environmental Law Review 42.
These were: 1997 – Heard Island, McDonald Island, Macquarie Island; 2000 – Blue
Mountains; 2003 – Bungle Bungle Range; 2004 – Melbourne’s Royal Exhibition
Building and Carlton Gardens; 2007 – Sydney Harbour, Opera House and foreshore.
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Australian places on
the World Heritage List (2008) <http://www.environment.gov.au/heritage/places/
world/index.html>.
Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment [1997] FCA 55; see R
Lyster, ‘The Relevance of the Precautionary Principle: Friends of Hinchinbrook
Society Inc v Minister for Environment’ (1997) 14 Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 390.
Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for Environment [1998] FCA 433.
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investigate the site and the proposal. It considered that the proposed mine
development posed threats to the site’s world heritage values and it recommended
that the mine be closed. The report, recommendations and the government’s
response (which rejected the report and recommendations) were considered by the
UNESCO World Heritage Committee in 1999, which decided not to list the Park as
a world heritage site in danger but was critical of the proposal and of the
government’s management of it.32
The controversies over Port Hinchinbrook and Kakadu were succeeded by new
measures to prevent further emerging management challenges at the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park and Shark Bay world heritage areas. The Howard government
invested substantial resources into improved management of Australian world
heritage sites. In 1997, it announced initiatives to better protect their world heritage
values by developing management plans, protecting critical habitat and upgrading
interpretation and visitor facilities.33 For many sites there had previously been no
management plans. In 1998, a report on Australia’s world heritage sites made
recommendations for their improved management and, the following year, a new
legislative regime was adopted for Australia’s world heritage sites. 34 These
introduced management systems to maintain the values of world heritage sites,
enhancing Australian implementation of the World Heritage Convention 35 and
again reflected the Howard government’s emphasis on compliance with
international obligations.
(b) Marine environment protection
In relation to protection of the marine environment, the following section examines
the Howard government’s approach to marine protected areas, waste dumping, and
Antarctica. Australian approaches to the regulation of vessel-based sources of
pollution under the 1973/78 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships 36 and related treaties adopted under the auspices of the
International Maritime Organisation are not addressed here. The practice of the
Howard government in this technically detailed field remained, consistent with
previous Australian governments, environmentally proactive and generally
demonstrated good compliance.
(i) Marine protected areas
In 1998, the international Year of the Oceans, the government adopted
Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP). 37 The AOP establishes a framework for
32
33
34
35

36
37

B Boer and G Wiffen, Heritage Law in Australia (2005), 87.
Eg, for Shark Bay a new administrative agreement between the Commonwealth and
Western Australian governments was adopted.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3 sub-div A.
But see: Boer and Wiffen, above n 32, 76; D Haigh, ‘Australian World Heritage, the
Constitution and International Law’ (2005) 22 Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 385.
(2 November 1973), 1340 UNTS 184, reprinted in (1973) 12 ILM 1319.
Senator R Hill, ‘World First Plan to Safeguard Our Oceans’ (Press Release, 23
December 1998).
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integrated ecosystem-based planning and management for Commonwealth waters
that aims to promote ecologically sustainable development of marine resources in a
way that both encourages industry and protects biological diversity.38 An important
facet of the marine conservation objectives of the AOP was the establishment of a
National Representative System of Marine Protected Areas. It was to ensure a
‘comprehensive, adequate and representative’ system of marine protected areas
throughout the nation’s waters.39 The first of these was the Great Australian Bight
Marine Park, proclaimed in 1998, as Australia’s (and, at the time, the world’s)
second-largest marine park (after the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park). In 1999, the
Tasmanian Seamounts Marine Reserve and Macquarie Island Marine Park were
declared. In July 2007, three years after the adoption of the South East Region
Marine Plan, 13 new marine protected areas for that region, comprising the largest
temperate water MPA network in the world (all in Commonwealth waters), were
declared.40 Protection of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park World Heritage Area
was strengthened by a series of amendments to regulations under the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park Act 1975 and to the Act itself, that extended prohibitions on
mining in 1999, strengthened measures to prevent shipping accidents in 2002,
rezoned the Area so as to increase the percentage under full environmental
protection from 4 per cent to 33 per cent in 2004 as well as by a major review of
the Act in 2006 to introduce, inter alia, broader management planning.41 These
developments assist Australia in meeting its CBD obligations in the marine sector.
They indicate a whole-of-government approach and a concern with compliance.
(ii) Waste dumping at sea
In 1998, the government removed the Australian reservation to amendments on
disposal of industrial wastes at sea under the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter42 (London Convention).
The reservation had been made in 1994 by the previous government to allow for a
phase-out period, completed in 1998, for the sea dumping of jarosite wastes, a
tailing from mining, off the coast of Tasmania. During 1996, a Protocol that
extensively revised the London Convention was adopted by the Convention parties.
The government ratified the Protocol in 2001 after passing amendments in 1999 to
the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 so as to be able to implement
the Protocol. 43 The Protocol itself came into force in 2006, the same year that
Australia submitted a formal proposal to amend the Protocol by listing carbon
dioxide as a waste that may be discharged into the seabed. That amendment came
38
39
40

41
42
43

Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Ocean Policy (1998) 2.
Ibid 45.
The areas were identified in May 2006 and declared in July 2007, see: Senator
I Campbell, ‘Australia leads world with new Marine Protected Areas’ (Press Release,
5 May 2006); the Hon M Turnbull, ‘World’s First Temperate Network of Marine
Reserves Declared’ (Press Release, 5 July 2007).
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority <http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au>.
(13 November 1972) [1985] ATS 16.
Department
of
Environment,
Dumping
Wastes
at
Sea
(2002)
<http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/pollution/dumping/dumping.html>.
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into force in 2007 to enable the geosequestration of greenhouse gases below the
seabed, such by injecting them into cavities left by exhausted natural gas
deposits. 44 Geosequestration is of potentially great significance for Australian
offshore oil and gas producers, although its technological and economic viability
has not yet been proved. The government’s approach in this area was characterised
by concern to protect sovereign interests, that is, the exploitation of national
hydrocarbon reserves, and to facilitate the use of industry-driven solutions to global
warming such as geosequestration
(iii) Antarctica
In 1999, the government announced that it would assert jurisdiction over the
continental shelf beyond the Australian exclusive economic zone offshore of the
Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). GeoScience Australia gathered information
on the geological extent of the continental shelf around mainland Australia and its
territories.45 In time to meet the international deadline of 2004, under Annex II of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea46 (UNCLOS), a submission setting out
all Australia’s extended continental shelf claims was made to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the relevant body established under that
Convention. However, Australia requested that the Commission postpone its
consideration of the Australian Antarctic continental shelf claim. The apparent
reason for the postponement of the AAT-related claim concerned the unresolved
Australian maritime boundaries with bordering Antarctic claimant states (France,
New Zealand and Norway). The Commission agreed to postpone consideration of
the AAT extended continental shelf claim and, in 2008, it approved the other
Australian extended continental shelf claims submitted. 47 The vast majority of
countries do not recognise the legitimacy of national claims to territorial
sovereignty or appurtenant maritime zones claimed in the Antarctic region. The
government’s reason for postponement would certainly have been the likelihood of
political challenges being made by other non-claimant states against Australia’s
Antarctic claim. Both Japan and the United States had objected to Australia’s
unilateral claim to an Antarctic exclusive economic zone in 1994 and more were
likely to do so in the multilateral process required for approval of an extended
continental shelf. In contrast, France, New Zealand and Norway have since
44

45

46
47

International Maritime Organisation, Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (2002)
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=258&doc_id=681#2006>.
Geoscience Australia, Law of the Sea (2008) <http://www.ga.gov.au/oceans/mc_los_
More.jsp>. In the summers of 2000 and 2001, bathymetric surveys were conducted
and data was processed in 2003 to determine the geological limits of the AAT
continental shelf.
(10 December 1982), 1833 UNTS 397.
Commonwealth of Australia, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Outer
Limits of Australia’s Continental Shelf Extending Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the
Territorial Sea Baseline – Executive Summary (2004); Statement by the Chairman of
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the
Commission, 25 April 2008, UN Doc CLCS/58.
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submitted extended continental shelf claims but have not claimed an Antarctic
extended continental shelf.
This episode demonstrated the Howard government’s emphasis on robust
assertion of sovereign rights. It also demonstrated continuity with previous
Australian governments. In 1994, the Keating government had declared an
exclusive economic zone offshore of the AAT. However, the claim to an AAT
extended continental shelf entailed higher financial and political risks, as the
continental shelf survey cost $A32 million and a UN multilateral deliberative
process was required for consideration of the claim. Nevertheless, the government
decided to make this Australian claim to the extended continental shelf and to
manage the associated political risks.
(c) Marine living resources management
Under the rubric of marine living resources, this section considers mainland
fisheries, Antarctic fisheries and marine wildlife.
(i) Mainland fisheries
Heightening concerns around the world concerning pressures on unsustainably
harvested fish stocks were shared by the Howard government. It was extremely
active in relation to a wide range of fisheries management efforts bordering the
mainland in the Arafura Sea, Central and Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and
Southern Ocean.
The government initiated action in 1999, in partnership with South Africa and
Belize, to prevent vessels registered in those countries from continuing to poach
Orange Roughy (Hoplosthethus Atlanticis) off the South Tasman Rise in Australian
southern waters, or to harvest fish stocks straddling Australian waters in a high seas
area being regulated by both Australia and New Zealand. South Africa cooperated
by revoking the licences of its vessels and Belize by deregistering them.48 In the
Arafura Sea, illegal fishing by mostly Indonesian fishers was also addressed by
strengthened law enforcement. Additional resources were allocated to surveillance
and interdiction, and facilities built for the detention of illegal fishers and for the
destruction of their forfeited vessels. Legislation was amended to enable foreign
fishers caught fishing illegally in the territorial sea to be jailed.49 The government
found legal avenues to detain crews of foreign vessels caught fishing illegally also
in the Australian exclusive economic zone, including for default on payment of a
fine and for resisting apprehension. 50 Laws increasing financial penalties for
foreign illegal fishing and imposing automatic forfeiture of the vessel, gear and
catch from the time of commencement of illegal fishing were imposed. 51 The
legality some of these measures under the UNCLOS, which does not permit a
coastal state to imprison foreign fishers for fishing illegally in its exclusive
48
49
50
51

Orange Roughy was also listed as a ‘conservation dependent’ species under s 194Q of
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 100B (as amended in 2006).
W Gullett, Fisheries Law in Australia (2008) 312.
Ibid 313.
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economic zone and requires the release of the vessel upon payment of a ‘reasonable
bond’,52 has been questioned.53 Nevertheless, poaching dropped dramatically.54
The government ratified the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the
High Seas in 2004. The government also sought to enforce responsible fisheries
management through international dispute settlement mechanisms, as demonstrated
in the case of southern bluefin tuna (thunnus maccoyii). This highly migratory
species ranges through Australia’s exclusive economic zone and the adjacent high
seas.55 Under UNCLOS, states are obliged to cooperate in the management of such
highly migratory stocks. 56 To better manage the stock, an agreement between
Australia, Japan and New Zealand had been adopted in 1993, that is, the
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 57 (CCSBT). The
CCSBT is premised on the Parties agreeing to a total allowable catch for the stock.
Unfortunately, Japan assessed the stock biomass as much more abundant than did
Australia and New Zealand and the Parties failed to agree on any quota after 1996.
In 1998, Japan commenced an extensive ‘experimental fishing program’ for 1,464
tons. Despite Australia’s important trade relationship with Japan, the Howard
government took the dispute to arbitration in 2000.58 The tribunal decided that it
did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter on the merits59 and, so, the dispute
resolution mechanism did not yield the result desired by the government.
52
53
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Above n 46, art 73.
Gullett, above n 50, 312; R Baird ‘Foreign Fisheries Enforcement: Do Not Pass Go,
Proceed Slowly to Jail – Is Australia Playing by the Rules?’ (2007) 30 University of
New South Wales Law Journal 1.
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Oceans Action
Bulletin:
1
June
2007
(2007)
<http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/oceans-action/june-07.html>.
Due to over fishing, the biomass of the stock had fallen to 10 per cent of its 1980
levels by 1996. It is fished primarily by Japanese fishing vessels as it is prized for
flavourful sashimi.
Above n 46, art 64.
(10 May 1993), 1819 UNTS 359.
In 1999, Australia and New Zealand applied successfully to the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for an injunction against Japan’s ‘experimental fishing
program’: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan)
(Provisional Measures) (1999) 38 ILM 1624. This decision was discussed in the agora
of the 2000 Yearbook of International Environmental Law. A general arbitral tribunal
established under Annex VII of the UNCLOS heard the matter for the resolution on
the merits in 2000: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australian and New Zealand v
Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359. This decision was
discussed in D Bialek, ‘Australia & New Zealand v Japan: Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case’ (2000) 1 Melbourne Journal of International Law 153.
The arbitral panel decided (4:1) that it did not have jurisdiction under UNCLOS
because the CCSBT governed the dispute and its dispute resolution procedure required
that its Parties continue with their negotiations. Its decision has been controversial:
D Colson and P Hoyle, ‘Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?’ (2003) 34 Ocean Development &
International Law 59; B Kwiatowska, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Did Get It
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In the Central and Western Pacific, the government worked through the Forum
Fisheries Agency to ensure the strongest possible conservation and enforcement
provisions in the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 60 which was
adopted in 2001 and ratified by Australia in 2003.61 The government supported
measures adopted by the Convention’s regional fisheries commission in 2006 to
enable parties to board and inspect each other’s fishing vessels to monitor
compliance with regional operational standards.
In mainland fisheries, a strong emphasis on enforcement was apparent in
government, most often in the form of committing resources for surveillance of
Australian waters, arrest of illegal foreign fishing vessels and their domestic
prosecution. No international court action to compel another country to perform its
environmental responsibilities was taken after the unfavourable outcome in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case,62 which might have signalled that arbitral tribunals
cannot be relied upon to confirm what the government considered to be its own
environmental rights and others’ obligations in the exclusive economic zone. The
Howard government’s concern to safeguard Australian sovereign rights in the
exclusive economic zone thereafter manifested itself in robust unilateral and
bilateral enforcement arrangements.
(ii) Antarctic fisheries
The most extraordinary efforts by the government to ensure protection of
Australian natural resources by enforcing compliance with fisheries laws took
place in sub-Antarctic waters. In 1996, Australia was enabled by the Commission
for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) 63 to open a new commercial fishery in its sub-Antarctic waters off
Heard Island and McDonald Island (HIMI), which fall within a zone largely
co-regulated by CCAMLR and Australia.64 The Howard government increased its
surveillance of sub-Antarctic waters and the Royal Australian Navy seized two
foreign vessels fishing illegally in those waters in 1997. 65 Huge efforts were

60
61
62

63
64

65

Right: A Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A Colson and Dr Peggy
Hoyle’ 34 Ocean Development & International Law 369. The parties did continue to
negotiate management and compliance measures and, in 2006, based upon evidence in
scientific and technical reports, Japan agreed to halve its catch.
(5 September 2001) 40(2) ILM 277, [2004] ATS 15.
G Rose, ‘Oceania’ (2000) 10 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 596.
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional
Measures) (1999) 38 ILM 1624; Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australian and New
Zealand v Japan) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (2000) 39 ILM 1359.
33 UST 3476; 1329 UNTS 48; (1980) 19 ILM 841.
In that year CCAMLR decided on new conservation measures for highly sought after
Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides also known as Chilean Sea Bass) and
Australia was therefore able to administer complementary implementing measures in
its HIMI waters, licensing vessels to fish there. Consequently, the licensed Australian
vessels reported illegal foreign fishing vessels there.
The Salvore (registered in Belize) and the Aliza Glacial (registered in Panama):
R Baird, ‘Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement
Action in the Heard and McDonald Islands Australian Fishing Zone’ (2004) 9 Deakin
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exerted to arrest the South Tomi in 2001. That vessel, registered in Togo, was
pursued for 14 days across the Indian Ocean, from Australia’s sub-Antarctic waters
nearly into South African waters.66 But that was not maximal effort. In 2003, the
Viarsa I, a Uruguayan registered vessel, was arrested after a hot pursuit that lasted
21 days and covered 4,000 nautical miles. 67 Further arrests were made in the
following years and, in each case, the master and/or crew were charged with
offences and the vessel, catch and gear forfeited to the government under new
Australian fisheries law. 68 These laws pushed the limits of international legal
constraints on coastal state enforcement rights imposed under UNCLOS.69
The arrests of the South Tomi and Viarsa were assisted by the South African
and United Kingdom governments. Other HIMI fisheries enforcement were also
characterised by international cooperative arrangements. Amid information that
some of vessels arrested in the 1997/1998 season were operated by Norwegian
interests under flags of convenience, the government negotiated successfully with
Norway in 1998 for tighter Norwegian regulation of its nationals operating
overseas. Australia and France signed in 2003 a Treaty on Cooperation in the
Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard
Island and the McDonald Islands.70 It facilitates cooperation in scientific research
and in surveillance and enforcement in their sub-Antarctic territories. Negotiations
were commenced for a formal agreement with South Africa.71
At the multilateral level, a broader system for stronger fisheries enforcement
was advanced by the Howard government’s promotion of the catch documentation
scheme, eventually adopted by CCAMLR in 1999. The scheme requires that a
catch be documented according to its location and fishing methodology before it
can be given market access to a CCAMLR state. 72 In 2004, the government

66
67
68
69

70
71
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Law Review 91.
Ibid.
Australian Antarctic Division, Poachers pursued over 7,000 kilometers (2004)
<http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=14710>.
In 2002, the Lena and the Volga, both Russian registered vessels, were arrested, as was
the Uruguayan registered Maya V in 2004 and the Cambodian Taruman in 2005.
Russia successfully contested the terms of a bond for release of the detained Volga
(see Volga Case (Russian Federation v Australia), ITLOS Case No 11, 23 December
2002 (2003) 42 ILM 159): W Gullett, ‘Developments in Australian Fisheries Law:
Setting the Law of the Sea Convention Adrift?’ (2004) 21 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 169. Subsequently, to avoid contests such as for the Volga, new
legislation automatically transfers the ownership of a foreign vessel to the Australian
government at the time that the vessel commences illegal fishing in Australian waters:
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 106A; Gullett, above n 50, 314.
[2004] ATNIA 8; JSCOT Rep 63; [2005] ATS 6.
A second agreement was adopted in 2007: W Gullett and C Schofield, ‘Pushing the
limits of the Law of the Sea Convention: Australian and French cooperative
surveillance and enforcement in the Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22 International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law 545.
This is a significant constraint on illegal fishing because 90 per cent of Patagonian
Toothfish is marketed within CCAMLR states. The government also proposed the
listing of Patagonian Toothfish in Appendix II of the CITES at COP 12 in 2002.
Listing would require that trade in that species be subject to the issue by national
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supported CCAMLR’s adoption of a centralised, common standard satellite-based
vessel monitoring system. It also supported the electronic adaptation of the catch
documentation scheme, better use and public dissemination of the Illegal
Unregulated and Unreported Vessel List that blacklists known offending vessels, as
well as enhanced systems for reporting sightings of potential illegal vessels.73
The high intensity of effort required for effective surveillance and arrest of
poaching vessels in HIMI again reflected the Howard government’s determination
to assert and defend Australian sovereign rights. It also indicated an application of
shared responsibility, where other states regulating fisheries operators, vessel
registers or contiguous fisheries were approached to share responsibility to curtail
poaching. Finally, it also suggested an inconsistency in maintaining the freedom of
markets, as the government uncharacteristically supported the use of the measures
to constrain trade by means of the Patagonian Toothfish catch documentation
scheme.
(iii) Marine wildlife
Throughout its period in office, the Howard government demonstrated that it
valued shared responsibility for the management of migratory species. In 1996, 11
species of albatross were listed in Appendices I and II under the Convention for the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 74 (Bonn Convention)
following an initiative of the Australian government. Albatross, which migrate
through the Southern Ocean region, are being decimated as incidental catch in
long-line fishing operations. In 1999, the government also supported the listing of
seven species of petrels under the Bonn Convention. That year, it led a further
initiative to negotiate a new regional convention under the aegis of the Bonn
Convention to conserve albatross, holding a meeting of southern hemisphere range
states in Hobart in 2000. The Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and
Petrels was adopted in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. Australia served as
interim secretariat and, on entry into force, as permanent secretariat.75
In relation to sea turtles, the government submitted third party proceedings to
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) against
trade-related environmental measures taken by the United States. A breach of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was asserted concerning
unilateral restrictions that prevented importation into the United States of shrimp
harvested by means that caused high incidental mortality to sea turtles. Australia’s
third party submission was not motivated by a desire to protect Australian shrimp

73
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75

authorities of export and import permits. The proposal was not successful but resulted
in the subsequent adoption of a recommendation that CITES Parties adopt the
CCAMLR catch documentation scheme and that the CITES Secretariat compile
information on its adoption by the Parties.
R Baird, ‘CCAMLR Initiatives to Counter Flag State Non Enforcement in Southern
Ocean Fisheries’ (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 733.
(1980) 19 ILM 15; [1991] ATS 32.
Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels [2004] ATS 5
<http://www.acap.aq>.
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exports, 76 but to protect trade freedoms from unilateral restrictions disguised as
environmental protection measures, consistent with the government’s positions
adopted in the WTO Trade and Environment Committee. The WTO Dispute
Settlement Body found that, although the restrictions were bona fide conservation
measures, their application was arbitrary.77 That the Howard government’s third
party submission was designed to curtail future environmentally disguised trade
restrictions is suggested by the apparently weak Australian direct national interest
in the circumstances.
From the outset, the Howard government strongly opposed whaling. In 1996,
its first year of office, it established a National Taskforce on Whaling to investigate
ways to support a permanent international ban on whaling. The Taskforce reported
in 1997 and, in response, the government adopted a policy for international
anti-whaling initiatives to be promoted through the International Whaling
Commission (IWC).78 In furtherance of its policy, the government proposed the
establishment of a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary to the IWC in 2000, 2002 and
2003.79 The government successfully moved in 2002 for the Conference of Parties
to the Bonn Convention to list in Appendix I of the Convention sei, fin and sperm
whales (as species that are endangered and must be protected), and to list in
Appendix II Brydes, Antarctic minke and pygmy right whales (as species having an
unfavourable conservation status). 80 Nevertheless, despite its robust approach in
international fora, the government was not willing to arrest Japanese whaling
vessels engaged in whaling in Australia’s Antarctic waters, although they were
clearly in breach of Australian law. 81 Nor would it initiate legal action against
whaling companies under either Australian law (where breach was clear) or under
international law (where a breach was much less certain). Instead, action for an
76
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Shortly thereafter, in 2000, the Howard government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Sea Turtles and their Habitats
(Indian Ocean and South East Asia). The Memorandum establishes a marine turtle
conservation and management plan.
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc
WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) (Report of the Appellate Body).
Commonwealth of Australia, A Universal Metaphor: Australia’s Opposition to
Commercial Whaling (1997). The policy measures included the adoption of a global
whale sanctuary, a 50-year commercial whaling moratorium and a prohibition on
scientific whaling.
Each time, the proposal failed to pass with a three-quarters majority vote. Support for
the sanctuary gradually increased from just Pacific Island countries to a simple
majority of the IWC. Interesting from a treaty law perspective was the government’s
argument against Iceland’s accession to the IWC, on the grounds that Iceland’s
reservation against the commercial whaling moratorium was incompatible with the
object and purpose of the IWC’s constitutional treaty, the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling (2 December 1946), 161 UNTS 72. That argument was
supported by a majority vote in 2001 but failed in 2002, when the IWC voted for
Iceland’s accession. In 2003, Australia also co-sponsored a resolution to the effect that
Iceland’s scientific whaling program was an abuse of the scientific whaling provisions
of the International Convention.
Under Australian legislation in 1998, fin, sei and sperm whales were previously listed
as endangered species, thereby prohibiting international trade in them.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 225.
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injunction against Japanese whalers was taken by a non-governmental organisation
in the Australian Federal Court. The Attorney-General, in a 2005 amicus curiae
brief requested by the bench, invited the Court to exercise its discretion not to
proceed on grounds of harm to Australia’s international relations.82
The Howard government’s anti-whaling policy was consistent with the
previous Fraser, Hawke and Keating governments’ opposition to commercial
whaling.83 The symbolic cause of whale protection is popular and has negligible
economic cost, making it an attractive soapbox issue. However, the government’s
apparently emotional and morally principled stance appears inconsistent with its
rational and managerial approach to other international environmental issues.
When it came to a test that would possibly result in a Japanese international legal
challenge to Australian sovereign rights to regulate whaling in the AAT exclusive
economic zone (and harm the delicate balance of Antarctic Treaty cooperative
relations), the government was unwilling to risk its claim to sovereign rights.84
Thus, protection of Australian sovereign rights was the government’s paramount
consideration.
(d) Atmosphere protection
The international legal aspects of atmosphere protection revolve around the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 85 (Montreal
Protocol) and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 86
(UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol.87
(i) Ozone layer
Australia has a direct national interest in reversing stratospheric ozone
depletion in the southern hemisphere’s high latitudes due to the resultant ultraviolet
radiation exposure that harms Australian life. The government accepted the 1997
Montreal Amendments to the Montreal Protocol in 1998 and a Methyl Bromide
Strategy was put in place to phase-out methyl bromide use in Australia’s
horticultural industries within the Montreal Protocol’s 2005 deadline. In 2000, the
82
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Humane Society International Inc (HSI) v Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd (KSK). The
Federal Court declined HSI’s application to serve process under the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 475 on KSK outside the
jurisdiction ([2005] FCA 664) but, on appeal, the Full Federal Court allowed the
application ([2006] FCAFC 116). The Japanese government refused to accept service
of process through the diplomatic channel, denying Australian jurisdiction over
Antarctic waters. The Federal Court then gave orders for substituted service on KSK
([2007] FCA 124) and, when the defendant did not respond to the served application,
followed with a default judgment to grant the injunction prohibiting whaling ([2008]
FCA 3).
The Fraser government illegalised Australian whaling under the Whale Protection Act
1980 (Cth).
R Davis, ‘Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HSI Litigation’ (2007) 8
Melbourne Journal of International Law 143.
(16 September 1987), 1522 UNTS 29.
1771 UNTS 107; S Treaty Doc No 102-38; UN Doc A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1;
(1992) 31 ILM 849; [2008] ATS 2.
UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (10 December 1997); (1998) 37 ILM 22.
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Australian Halon Management Strategy was instituted to provide a framework for
management of Australia’s halon stocks to 2030 and the ultimate elimination of
their use. The National Halon Bank is designed to help reduce halon stocks
throughout the Asia-Pacific through collection and storage and to supply it for
essential uses in Australia and overseas. The 1999 Beijing Amendments to the
Montreal Protocol regulating bromochloromethane were accepted in 2005.
Australia’s implementation of the Montreal Protocol has long been conscientious,
under the Howard and previous governments, due to the perception that the global
regime can and does work and has a high, direct national benefit. It contrasts
strongly with the Howard government’s approach to multilateral cooperation to
combat climate change.
(ii) Climate change
The Howard government maintained the negotiation position of the Keating
government when it took over participation in multilateral negotiations for a
protocol to the UNFCCC in 1996. It indicated its opposition to global warming
mitigation measures in the form of legally binding targets for greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG) reductions. Although such targets were ultimately adopted when
the negotiations concluded in 1997, Robert Hill, then Minister for Environment,
negotiated into the morning of the last night to secure economically favourable
outcomes for Australia.88 These outcomes included agreement on no gross GHG
emission reduction target for Australia and the recognition of land use and forestry
changes as mitigation measures. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol allows Australia to
increase its GHG emissions by 8 per cent above the 1990 ‘baseline level’ during
the 2008-2012 ‘commitment period’ 89 and counts reductions in the rate of land
clearing (ie removal of native forest) and increases in afforestation towards
emission reductions.90
In 1999, JSCOT inconclusively considered ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
pending resolution of outstanding negotiation issues and, in 2000, the Minister
indicated that these issues included substantial accounting for carbon sinks,
refinement of market-based approaches to minimise the cost of GHG abatement
such as credits for emissions trading and for investment in low emissions
technology in developing countries (ie the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’), and
measures to engage developing countries in emissions reduction commitments.
Despite negotiation progress on some of these issues, in 2002, he announced that
Australia would not ratify the Protocol, although it would honour the target under
the Protocol, by containing Australia’s GHG emissions growth to 8 per cent.
That year, the Howard government began to explore international cooperative
initiatives outside the Protocol to mitigate GHGs. A bilateral Climate Action
88
89
90

C Hamilton, Running from the Storm – The Development of Climate Change Policy in
Australia (2001) 88.
Above n 87, Annex 1.
Ibid art 3.7; I Fry, ‘Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of Land
Use, Land Use Change and Forestry Decisions with the Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 159.
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Partnership was entered into with the United States, focusing initially on
technological cooperation to innovate in the area of clean coal, geosequestration
and alternative options for remote area energy supply. In 2003, Australia
formalised bilateral cooperative arrangements with China, New Zealand and the
European Union. In 2006 a bilateral partnership was initiated with Japan and South
Africa.91
At the multilateral level, the Howard government pursued its climate change
agenda outside the Kyoto Protocol principally through the Asia Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate (APP), established in 2006, and through
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Members of the APP are Australia,
Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea and the United States, comprising both publicand private-sector participants. 92 At the APEC annual Leaders Summit, held in
Sydney in 2007, the Sydney Declaration on Climate Change was adopted. The
twenty-one APEC leaders, including developing countries such as Indonesia and
Malaysia, stated the general objective of reducing GHGs, after the Kyoto Protocol
expires in 2012, by utilising methods such as energy efficiency, low emissions
technologies and by arresting deforestation. 93 The government also committed
$A200 million to a Global Initiative on Forests and Climate to prevent
deforestation in developing countries, including in the Kalimantan forests in
Indonesia.
Several measures to contain Australian GHG emissions growth, particularly
from industrial sources, were undertaken. Most were premised on domestic
private-sector voluntary steps to be stimulated by financial incentives provided by
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The partnership with the United States extends to over 20 projects, including synthetic
greenhouse gases and energy efficiency. A Joint Declaration on Bilateral Cooperation
on Climate Change was signed with China, seeking to explore a broad range of climate
change responses. A partnership was entered into with New Zealand, much of it
addressing collaboration in regional scientific studies and support for Pacific Island
countries but also addressing common energy efficiency standards. Broad-ranging
cooperation was specified under the Review of the Joint Declaration on Relations with
the European Union. Department of Climate Change, Australia’s International climate
change partnerships (2007) <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/international/partner
ships/index.html>.
They formed eight task forces and corresponding action plans for projects partly
supported by public funding including $A100 million. However, the AP6 initiative has
been critiqued as inadequate and as undermining the Kyoto Protocol: P Christoff and
R Eckersley, ‘Kyoto and the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate’ in T Bonyhady and P Christoff (eds), Climate Change in Australia (2007) ch
3; P Lawrence, ‘The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
(AP6): a distraction to the Kyoto process or a viable alternative?’ (2007) University of
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper 72
<http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps/art72>.
Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation,
Energy
Working
Group
(2008)
<http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_economic/working_grou
ps/energy.html>. Previously, the only international cooperation with an ASEAN
member country was a pilot program for ‘Activities Implemented Jointly’ under the
UNFCCC between Australia and Indonesia in 1996.
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the government.94 To coordinate GHG emissions accounting and to manage the
programs, a National Greenhouse Office was established in 1997 as an agency
under the aegis of both the environment and of the agriculture and forests
departments. Drawing a variety of measures together, a National Greenhouse
Strategy was adopted in 1998. However, emissions mitigation measures remained
based in policy rather than legislative instruments. 95 Their voluntary nature and
inadequate public funding ensured that they were of little effect. The first
obligatory measure was introduced in 2000, when the government legislated that,
by 2010, wholesale distributors of electricity must obtain at least a modest 2 per
cent of their energy from renewable sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal or
tidal energy.96 In 2003, further legislation was enacted on synthetic gases replacing
substances that deplete the ozone layer, 97 many of which have severe global
warming effects. The major watershed was the National Greenhouse and Energy
Reporting Act 2007, designed to establish a single, national system for reporting
greenhouse gas emissions, abatement actions and energy consumption and
production by corporations to underpin the proposed Australian Emissions Trading
Scheme. In 2006, the government predicted that it would exceed its Kyoto target by
1 per cent.98
The Howard government’s decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was the
most unpopular environmental action of its incumbency, at both domestic and
international levels. It denied itself international appreciation and positioning at the
Kyoto implementation negotiation table. It also denied Australian businesses a full
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Eg, the Greenhouse Challenge program was introduced in 1996 to engage Australian
companies. Over 100 companies signed voluntary target agreements with the
government over the following year. Other programs included: 1997 – Safeguarding
the Future: Australia’s Response to Climate Change, Cities for Climate Protection,
Bush for Greenhouse, and 1999 – Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program. See
R Sullivan, ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: A new departure or more of the same?’
(2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 60; D Jones, ‘The Kyoto
Protocol, Carbon Sinks and Integrated Environmental Regulation: an Australian
Perspective’ (2002) 19 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 110.
In 2000, the government issued a discussion paper proposing a legislative amendment
that would require a national environmental impact assessment process for any
development proposals that would emit GHG emissions beyond the amount of
0.5 million tonnes in a year (approximately 10% of Australia’s average annual GHG
emissions increases from fossil fuel sources). The proposal was not adopted. Similarly,
a Bill to implement the UNFCCC, proposed by the Greens (Convention on Climate
Change (Implementation) Bill), obtained no traction in the Senate Committee on
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts in 1999.
This requirement, known as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), was
widely criticised as too unambitious. It is supervised by the Office of the Renewable
Energy Regulator (established in 2001): <http://www.orer.gov.au>.
Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Amendment
Regulations 2004 (Cth), under the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas
Management Act 1989 (Cth). It creates national standards for licensing to control
activities involving synthetic greenhouse gases.
T M Power, ‘Issues and Opportunities for Australia under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2003)
20 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 459; Australian Greenhouse Office,
Tracking to the Kyoto Target 2006 (2006).
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opportunity to participate early in emerging carbon markets. That drastic decision
not to ratify might be taken as proof that the government was in thrall to Australian
domestic mining industry opposition to the Protocol, although that seems unlikely
given the fact of Australian implementation of the Protocol. 99 Another
interpretation is that the government made a diplomatic assessment that it would be
more influential in persuading developing countries to undertake greenhouse gas
emissions mitigation commitments during negotiation of a new Protocol after the
Kyoto commitment period expires in 2012 if it maintained the credible threat of
principled non-participation by developed countries in the absence of developing
country commitments. The latter interpretation was one of the government’s stated
positions and is consonant with its emphasis on shared global responsibility, as
developing countries have no commitment to mitigate GHG emissions under the
Kyoto Protocol. 100 Nevertheless, there were good diplomatic arguments to the
contrary of that position, not least that ratification was inevitable if Australia was to
participate in the Kyoto Protocol carbon markets.101
(e) Hazardous materials
International coordination and cooperation in the management of hazardous wastes
and chemicals are primarily regulated under the 1989 Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal102
(Basel Convention), the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants103 (POPs Convention) and the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade 104 (PIC Convention). Further treaties, not addressed here,
govern other aspects of hazardous materials management, such as those concerning
radioactive, pharmaceutical and alimentary substances.
(i) Hazardous waste
The Howard government maintained its opposition to a blanket ban on the
export of hazardous waste to developing countries, consistent with policy of the
Keating government. Throughout its term, it declined to ratify the amendment to
the Basel Convention that would make a ban legally binding. However, in a
99
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R Lyster, ‘Common but Differentiated?: Australia’s Response to Global Climate
Change’ (2004) 26 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 561.
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility as manifest in
environmental treaty provisions provides developing countries with definite but
delayed or reduced implementation responsibility and provides financial and technical
assistance to them to promote their implementation efforts. The Montreal Protocol, for
example, entails common but differentiated developing country responsibilities to
phase out substances that deplete the ozone layer. For a detailed discussion of the
principle, see: L Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law
(2006).
Cogent arguments for ratification, including carbon market positioning, are set out in
G Pearse High and Dry (2007) 356 ff.
1673 UNTS 126; (1989) 28 ILM 657; [1992] ATS 7.
(2001) 40 ILM 531; [2004] ATS 23.
(1998) 38 ILM 1; [2004] ATS 22.
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regional compromise in 1998, Australia supported the negotiation of and then
ratified the Waigani Convention, a South Pacific regional treaty that bans the
export from outside the region of hazardous wastes to Pacific Forum countries,
other than to Australia and New Zealand. It allows the export of waste by Pacific
Forum countries but requires that shipments be conducted in a safe and
environmentally sound manner. 105 The government also declined to ratify the
Basel Convention’s liability protocol.106 Regulations under the Hazardous Waste
(Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989, which implements the Basel
Convention, were amended in 1999 to accommodate the Waigani Convention and
amended again in 2003 to accommodate hazardous waste imports into Australia
from East Timor. Due to the difficulty in identifying the characteristics of
hazardous wastes while they are in transit, the government accepted newly
negotiated annexes for the Basel Convention and adopted implementing regulations
for them in 1998, making it simpler to identify hazardous wastes for the purposes
of the regulating transboundary movements.107 Further regulatory simplifications
were adopted in 2004, to implement a binding decision of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that harmonised arrangements
among its members with the new annexes of the Basel Convention.108
Although the Howard government met its treaty commitments, it declined to
ratify the Basel Convention ban which, in its consideration, obstructed recycling of
hazardous waste. Further, its record of approvals for export of hazardous waste
indicated shallow implementation of the Basel Convention’s waste minimisation
and local disposal obligations. The government characteristically preferred to allow
market forces to operate.109
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Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movements and Management
of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region (16 September 1995), 2161
UNTS 93. Amendments to the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports)
Regulations 1996 (Cth) were adopted in 1999.
The Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (10 December
1999) <http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf>, is not widely
ratified and has not yet entered into force.
Annexes VIII and IX to the Basel Convention provide additional classification
categories for hazardous waste streams, above n 102.
Revision of Decision C(92)39/FINAL on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations, OECD Doc C(2001)107 (2001) (Decision
of the Council). The decision addressed transboundary movements for the purpose of
the recycling of hazardous wastes. Australia is a member of the OECD.
Yet, in 1999, the government declined to allow market forces to operate when it
prohibited the importation into Australia of radioactive waste for disposal: Customs
Amendment (Anti-Radioactive Waste Storage Dump) Act 2000 (Cth).
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(ii) Hazardous chemicals
A National Strategy for the Management of Scheduled Waste,110 dealing with a
range of wastes regulated by the Basel Convention, and more particularised waste
management plans for them, were already in place in 2004, when Australia became
a party to the POPs Convention. As several hazardous wastes are also persistent
organic pollutants, there is overlap between the two conventions’ obligations and
their implementation. Further subject matter overlap occurs with the PIC
Convention, which was ratified also in 2004. The National Industrial Chemicals
Notification and Assessment Scheme (NICNAS), 111 together with the National
Registration Scheme for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (NRS)112 managed
by the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA), 113
both extant at the time of ratification, are used to implement PIC Convention
obligations. However, as required under the POPs Convention, the government
published a POPs National Implementation Plan in 2006. The Howard government
was not enthusiastic in negotiating the new trade restrictive measures employed in
the hazardous chemicals treaties and utilised mostly existing regulations for their
implementation. It is likely that this infrastructure will need to be reviewed for its
international compliance.
(f) Sustainable development framework
In drafting the EPBC Act, the Howard government entrenched the fin de siecle
paradigms of sustainable development. The Act’s extensive objectives include
ecologically sustainable development,114 which is defined in terms familiar from
the 1992 UN Summit Conference on Environment and Development. 115 Other
objectives include protection of the environment, conservation of biodiversity, and
cooperative management with the community, land-holders and indigenous
peoples. The precautionary principle is separately defined in terms similar to those
in the Rio Declaration116 and is specified as an obligatory consideration in certain
ministerial decision-making.117 Public participation is provided for in the forms of
community consultation, input into assessment and approval of development
110
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Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2007) <http://www.environment.gov.au/
settlements/chemicals/pop.html>.
Department of Health and Aging, About NICNAS (2008) <http://www.nicnas.gov.au/
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Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Agricultural and Veterinary
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Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3A; Rio
Declaration above n 1.
Rio Declaration above n 1, Principle 15: ‘Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
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Act s 391.
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actions, the monitoring of agreements and the preparation of management plans,
recovery plans and threat abatement plans. In relation to the general international
requirement of conduct of environmental impact assessments,118 the Act provides
that the Commonwealth shall assess the potential impacts of development
proposals on matters of national environmental significance. 119 Strategic
assessments are also provided for.120
The implementation of aspects of specified environmental treaties is also
achieved through the EPBC Act. For example, matters of national environmental
significance that may trigger the conduct of environmental impact assessments are
defined in terms that implement some Commonwealth obligations under treaties
including the CBD, CITES, Ramsar Convention, Bonn Convention, migratory
birds conventions, UNCLOS and World Heritage Convention. 121 Similarly,
categories of management arrangements for protected areas are identified in terms
that implement conservation treaties, such as concerning world heritage and
wetlands.122 In relation to implementation and enforcement more generally, the Act
strengthened Commonwealth powers to enforce compliance. For example,
compliance can be monitored and audited.123 More generally, an annual report is to
be made on the operation of the Act124 and, every five years, a national State of the
Environment Report produced.125
The introduction into Parliament and passage of the EPBC Act revolutionised
the relationship of international environmental law with Commonwealth
environmental law and administration. 126 First, it advanced Australian
implementation of the emergent international norms of sustainable development.
Second, it improved Australian systems for implementation of several
environmental treaties. Both were consonant with the government’s emphasis on
compliance. Despite the permissive formulation of some environmental treaty
obligations, such that they serve as ‘soft law’ that articulate environmental
aspirations and function as policy education, the government’s emphasis upon
compliance suggested a positivist approach to international environmental law
obligations.
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Rio Declaration, above n 1, Principle 17: ‘Environmental impact assessment, as a
national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a
significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a
competent national authority.’
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3; EPBC Act
pt 3.
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 146; Gullett,
above n 50, 142-47.
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IV. Conclusion
At the outset, this paper proposed that the Howard government’s approaches to the
field of international environmental law were primarily characterised by emphasis
on sovereign rights, shared global responsibility, market forces and compliance.
The review and analysis of the government’s practice across environmental and
natural resources sectors indicates that these emphases were uneven. There is
persuasive evidence for strong emphases on sovereign rights and on compliance
but less evidence for commitment to shared global responsibility and the play of
market forces.
The emphasis on sovereign rights was apparent in some tough international
policy and enforcement action, such as in the Antarctic extended continental shelf
claim, where a policy to assert sovereign rights was acted upon even though
sovereignty was at its most tenuous. Defence of sovereign rights was also clear in
the government’s muscular new laws on illegal foreign fishing and its
extraordinary fisheries enforcement efforts, especially in the sub-Antarctic. At
times, its fishing enforcement action was undertaken despite tension with
international legal constraints on pursuit and detention of foreign fishing vessels
and crew. This assertiveness of sovereign rights and the national interest impact
assessment of proposed treaty actions reflected the government’s predominantly
realist perspective on international relations. Securing sovereign rights over
Australia’s maritime frontiers and their marine resources, particularly to ensure
their sustainable management, was a major priority of the Howard government.
Indicators for the characteristic of internationally shared global responsibility
for environmental management are evident but less clear. The government ratified
many environmental treaties and amendments during its term that created global
obligations for Australia, including for the conservation of albatross and petrels
and for fisheries in the southern ocean. In relation to climate change, it
demonstrated steadfastness in its demands for comparable shared responsibility for
developing countries, even when it would have been diplomatically easier to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol that it was already implementing. However, in relation to
Australia’s shared responsibility for the control of trade in genetically modified
organisms, the government failed to ratify the Biosafety Protocol, which would
commit Australia to export-control obligations complementary to impact
assessment obligations for importing countries.
The evidence for emphasis on the play of market forces is ambivalent. On the
one hand, it was indicated by the government’s support for international
private-sector initiatives, including geosequestration to combat climate change and
simplification of the laws for trade in endangered species, as well as by its
opposition to the Basel Convention ban. Within the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body, it also fought against certain unilateral trade restrictive measures adopted for
environmental purposes. On the other hand, the government failed to adopt
measures to promote Australian participation in emerging carbon markets, even
outside the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, and was willing to agree to
multilateral controls on trade in hazardous chemicals and even to promote
multilateral trade measures to conserve Patagonian Toothfish. Further, it adopted
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unilateral Australian trade restrictive measures against trade in African elephant
imports. An explanation of the marked inconsistencies might lie in a chronological
analysis of policy shifts. In the mid-1990s, when the Howard government came to
office, integration of trade policy with international environmental policy was in
progress as a result of the 1989 merger of the Department of Foreign Affairs with
the Department of Trade. That integration was initially characterised by a new
bureaucratic opposition to trade restrictive environmental measures but that
opposition moderated over time. However, closer analysis would be necessary to
evaluate this explanation.
Concerning domestic compliance, the Howard government’s commitment is
certain. Its introduction of new Parliamentary processes contributed to transparency
and accountability of the executive in its conduct of international law-making, in
particular so as to ensure that it could meet its obligations. The reformulation of the
Commonwealth framework for fundamental sustainable development laws
included strengthened domestic enforcement and improved management systems.
This was complemented by enhanced specific implementation of international
obligations concerning biodiversity, wetlands and world heritage, supported by
generous funding measures. Extending implementation to sea, marine parks
became a prominent feature among Australian national parks. In addition, the
government took international legal action to compel Japanese compliance in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, apparently expecting to be confirmed in a legally
binding outcome. The government’s diligent concern with compliance suggested a
positivist approach to the rule of international law. Nevertheless, compliance was a
concern subordinated to effective protection of sovereign rights, as indicated by the
questionable legality of some Australian practices in fisheries enforcement.
Overall, there are no agreed criteria to evaluate the relative domestic and
international ‘success’ of the Howard government’s approaches to international
law in the field of environment. On the negative side of the ledger, the first
environmental act of the incoming Rudd government was to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol, signifying that the costs to Australia of the Howard government standing
outside the international consensus were considered too high. On the positive side,
the rule of international law in the field of environment was reinforced by a
strengthened Australian domestic compliance infrastructure and the sub-Antarctic
and Western Pacific region benefited from the formulation of new Australiandriven international environmental norms.

